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Abstract
This paper considers growing fiscal capacity of the European early modern states
as contingent to taxpayer’s consent in higher tax loads. It puts forward the hypothesis
that war damages were the main factor guiding the taxpayer’s cost-benefit assessment
of consenting or violently resisting to a fiscal innovation. To test the hypotheses,
we consider data on Portugal in times of political struggle against the Habsburgs to
restore and keep the political autonomy after 1640. The war was financed by an
entirely new, universal income tax, remaining in the Portuguese fiscal system well
until the liberal revolution in 1820, although enforced by a decentralized and non-
specialized administration. A model derives the optimal tax rate from the standpoint
of the taxpayer as a function of war intensity, risk aversion, and awareness that evasion
would enhance war damages. Data on damages, contemporary assessments of the tax
base, and amounts enforced allow the model’s calibration. Results suggest the accuracy
of the hypothesis and draw the conclusion that taxpayers’ utility in paying the new
tax determined the e↵ective tax rate (tax enforced). This paper claims that ultimately
improvements in the fiscal capacity of states needed taxpayer’s perception of high levels
of destruction, hence any political regime in early modern Europe must have found in
war damages a persuasive argument to make e↵ective a fiscal innovation. The other
contribution of this case study is pointing out the advantage of the assignment of the
tax collection to local, non-professional administration, for the endurance of a fiscal
system, which incorporated an income tax that withstood the liberal revolution. It
enhanced the role of peer monitoring and turned out to be an e↵ective way of instilling
social norms contributing to build up the taxpayer’s liability, which somehow the liberal
state in 19th century exploited within a di↵erent technological environment.
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1 Introduction
Quantitative and comparative analyses of fiscal e cacy in early modern Europe acknowl-
edge the coercive components of fiscal systems, as much as evasion (Bonney (1999), Ho↵man
and Norberg (1994), Tilly (1990), Brewer (1989), O’Brien and Hunt (1999)). Evasion is the
flipside of consent; thus taxpayer’s cooperative behavior is another dimension of the prob-
lem, although harder to apprehend in a historical perspective of state building. This paper
takes this challenge as motivation and searches the incentives for taxpayers’ consent in fiscal
innovations, particularly if fiscal innovations increased the tax load. A full understanding
of the rise of early modern states’ fiscal capacity should consider plural paths towards lower
political costs of extraction. We put forward the hypothesis that the rulers’ capacity to
extract revenues depended on the taxpayer’s utility in diverting the threat of losing income
and property in war contexts, in as much as on tax collection systems based on local, ad hoc
organizations. State making processes may imply taxpayers’ cooperative behavior, which
in turn may have required institutional arrangements diverse from those found in modern,
Weberian ideal-type states, assisted by centralized and e cient tax administrations (Ardent
(1975), Besley and Persson (2011), Epstein (2000), Mann (1986), Ogilvie and Carus (2014),
Tilly (1975, 1990)). If informational costs were high, local administration involving peer
monitoring and reputational devices may have contributed to build up taxpayers’ liability.
Portugal in the 17th century can be an illustrative case to test our hypothesis. This
country history tells us the political limits of taxation in early modern Europe entailing the
fragmentation of large units, like the Habsburg monarchy. Portugal restored independence
in 1640, after a period of widespread unrest incited by several new levies. The rule of the
new king John IV doubled the state’s fiscal capacity through means repudiated a few years
earlier. The war against the Habsburg Philip IV was thus financed by an entirely new,
uniform income tax, levied at 10% rate (Costa (2005), Costa and Cunha (2006), Magalhães
(2004)). Once the war was over, the endurance of the tax was assured by a reduction
of the rate to 4.5%, which allowed this tax to withstand the liberal revolution in 1821.
The shifting behavior of the Portuguese taxpayer from 1638 to 1641, within four years of
political contention, supports the notion that consent was a determinant variable in the
fiscal innovation success, since the legitimation of the new king’s authority was not entirely
established and no administrative infrastructure could e ciently control evasion1.
This paper relates the taxpayer’s behavior, modelled as a variant of the Alligham and
1Political legitimacy has received scarce attention in state making literature (Greif and Rubin (2015))
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Sandmo (1972) tax evasion, to data on war damages and intensity of the war. In this case
the tax-payer can gamble jointly with the tax authority (as in that paper) and with war
damages. Although war damages are random, the tax-payer derives benefits from taxes as
a way to keep war at bay. Data on damages, contemporary assessments of the tax base,
and amounts collected allow the model’s calibration to test the accuracy of the hypothesis.
Those two reasons for paying taxes, penalty avoidance and protection provided by taxes,
which we can call extrinsic motives, add to intrinsic motives, which we assume deriving from
a tax morale instilled by tax collection systems (Luttmer and Singhal (2014)) and a clearer
perceived legitimacy of the decision process.
The notion that increasing levels of destruction improved fiscal capacity is a critical
inference from the model. Results also show the consistency of a lower rate, close to the
optimal rate, once the war was over, which suggests the e cacy of substituting the coercive
component ascribed to a centralized administration by peer monitoring and reputational
constraints at the community level.
This research broadens the current view on fiscal capacity, which has been most focused on
political constitutions since North and Weingast seminal work (North and Weingast (1989))
and on tax systems (centralized versus decentralized), whereas the methods of collection and
taxpayers’ willingness to pay are topics less covered in the theoretical literature (Dincecco
(2009), Van Zanden and Prak (2006), Karaman and Pamuk (2010)). Our conclusions point to
war damages on capital as a condition to make valid a fiscal innovation, which is an inference
applied either to absolutist or parliamentary regimes in early modern Europe. Besides, this
study adds historical evidence of the local collection of centralized taxes, curtailing moral
hazard issues and regional free riding, which compensated the low enforcement capacity of
the centralized administration.
2 War and taxes
Since the fall of the Roman Empire, military rivalry and political fragmentation describe the
European political and financial development. Rulers took part in a winner-take-all game,
whose spillovers in technological improvements underpinned Europe’s ability to capture rents
at a global scale after 1500. This military background challenged the integrity of large units,
such as the Habsburg monarchy, and hampered the rise of continental empires like China in
Asia (Ho↵man (2015)). Above all, in its long-term consequences, military might underpinned
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a social order based on what J. Schumpeter called the tax state (Schumpeter (1991)(1918))
allowing the rulers to extract a share of the economic surplus as a means to finance such a
violent environment. An impressive body of scholarly works has addressed the history of the
fiscal state and questioned the factors for growing fiscal capacity. An extended sample of
studies has observed the sources of revenue, expenditure, and tax structures (Bonney (1999),
Brewer (1989), Ormrod et al. (1999), O’Brien (1988, 2001) Fritschy (2003), t Hart (1993),
Ho↵man and Norberg (1994), Yun Casalilla (2004)). Another significant strand of researchers
delve into the factors for the state’s financial credibility, pursuing the lead of Dickson’s
(Dickson (1967)) work on English financial revolution and North and Weingast’s (North and
Weingast (1989)) view on political constitution impacts on fiscal e ciency (Ho↵man and
Norberg (1994), Epstein (2000), Carruthers (1996), Cox (2011), Dincecco (2009), Van Zanden
and Prak (2006), Grafe (2012), Grafe and Irigoin (2012), Co↵man et al. (2013)).
Recently a theoretical literature has explored the causal links between political insti-
tutions and fiscal income. Significant contributions have shown that centralized taxation
(Dincecco (2009)), the size of the territory and the partisan composition of parliaments
(Carruthers (1996), Stasavage (2010, 2011), Dincecco and Katz (2016)) mattered. Neverthe-
less, economic fundamentals should also be included in the list of causes, since the degree
of monetization and the sectoral composition of the GDP a↵ect the statistical significance
of political constitutions. Thus, political regime mattered, but as Karaman and Pamuk
demonstrated, it did it in a contingent way (Karaman and Pamuk (2010)).
Taking into account the regularities in the process of state-making in Europe we have
just pointed out, the case we address in this paper presents some unusual features regarding
the tax structure, the administration of tax collection, and the political constitution that
supports the state’s ability to raise extraordinary taxation.
Firstly, considering tax structures, Great Britain and the United Provinces illustrate the
success of indirect taxation and public debt to wage long-lasting wars (Fritschy (2003), t Hart
(1993), O’Brien (1988), O’Brien and Hunt (1999)). Apart from Great Britain’s experience
during the Napoleonic wars (O’Brien (2001)), there is no study documenting the introduction
of an income tax financing a war and becoming a permanent component of a tax system.
Portugal raised an income tax in 1640 and kept it in its fiscal system after the war against
the Habsburgs ended in 1668. Although Portugal and United Provinces emerged victorious
in their fight for political autonomy, remarkable di↵erences separate both cases concerning
the financial solutions adopted.
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There is evidence of direct taxation raising informational and negotiation costs (Bon-
ney, 1999, p. 434), when compared with other forms of taxation. The successful cases in
northwestern Europe led scholars to emphasize the advantages of indirect taxes in the first
stages of political development. However, a comparison between operational costs of direct
versus indirect taxation is missing, so there is no demonstration that direct taxation im-
posed unsurmountable costs of compliance. Administrative issues have a part in the range
of variables a↵ecting the fiscal capacity of states, and well-grounded literature has consis-
tently shown that centralization increased fiscal e ciency. Yet, centralized taxation is often
a loosely defined concept (Summerhill, 2008, p.222-3) either denoting uniform tax rates or
professional and centralized bureaucracy neutralizing local elites’ resistance and regional free
riding (Dincecco (2009) and Dincecco and Katz (2016)). In any event, centralized tax rates
and local, non-professional, administrations worked together in early modern Europe. This
same combination enforced the Land Tax in England and still propelled public revenue after
the Glorious Revolution (Beckett (1985), Beckett and Turner (1990)). Growing fiscal e -
ciency counted on the sovereigns’ exploitation of taxpayers’ social safety nets which raised
reputational restraints to free riding (Greif et al. (2013)), and made local administration as
e↵ective as a centralized bureaucracy to raise taxes. The success of the financial innova-
tion in Portugal rested on a universal tax rate, on the centralization of both the revenue
and expenditure, while the collection was left to local, ad-hoc administration, encroached in
taxpayers’ nets.
Secondly, considering the political constitution which proved better in improving fiscal
capacity, parliamentary representation is deemed more e↵ective because it monitored govern-
ment’s expenditure and made it easier to authorize more funds to wage wars. The benefits of
this institutional arrangement rely on consent rather than coercion. Still, any other means
of informing the taxpayer’s decisions as it happened when the quartering of troops a↵ected
the daily life of villages and households may eventually incite consent on higher tax burden
and improve the state’s fiscal capacity as much as political representation did. The literature
concerned with state’s capacity has thus not carefully examined the diversity of mechanisms
which could frame taxpayers’ rationale.
Finally, since Schumpeter’s foundational paper, taxes and public debt are thought a
consequence of the rulers’ monopoly of violence, meaning that protection (to property and
people’s physical integrity) was the public good at stake in any process of state making
(Besley and Persson (2009)). However, war could be in many respects a ”private good of
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princes in their search for glory and personal power, with financing often meeting the resis-
tance of taxpayers” (Gennaioli and Voth (2015)). In that case, the question turns out to be:
how did a private war of princes become a taxpayer’s private concern? We dwelve into this
issue by conceding that legitimation of expenditure and information asymmetry severely con-
strained early modern states’ capacity. Still, political representation and tax centralization
(the ideal-type in a modern state) were means among others of releasing these constraints.
Therefore, absolutist regimes could have also improved fiscal capacity not necessarily by rest-
ing on higher levels of coercion. For further discussion of the factors for improving state’s
fiscal capacity we need to pointing out Portuguese taxation main features. In the next sec-
tion, we describe the institutionally distinct sources of revenue and systematize the uniform
and centralized taxes that characterized the Portuguese fiscal system since medieval times,
which will tell us whether the new income tax introduced in 1640 consistently changed the
state’s fiscal capacity.
3 Portugal’s fiscal history: 1500-1638
3.1 Government sources of income
The institutional framework of taxation demands an analytical distinction between the rev-
enue derived from the exploitation of the colonial empire and that depending on the domestic
economy. A significant part of the state’s colonial revenues were domain rights, regularly
farmed out to private investors, which duly endorses historians’ view on early modern Portu-
gal as an entrepreneurial variant of a domain State (Ormrod et al., 1999, p. 12-15). Besides,
the economy overseas generated fiscal revenues not transferred to Portugal, respecting the
principle of the colonies’ fincial self-su ciency. Hence, ruling and defending the colonial em-
pire was not supposed to require tax streams to back up the royal power overseas (Pedreira
(2007)). Notwithstanding its domain features, the role of the empire stood out in the 16th
century (see Table 1) by granting 57 percent of total revenues. Conversely, the impact of the
colonial trade on Portugal’s GDP by that time was almost insignificant. In the golden age
of Brazil (1700-1780), colonial rents hovered around 31-33 percent, but then the trade in the
colonial system boosted the kingdom’s GDP per capita significantly (Costa et al. (2015)).
Hence, the contribution of the empire to the state’s total income did not necessarily go in
tandem with its contribution to the macroeconomic performance of the mother country.
State making meant increasing fiscal e ciency together with a territorialized system of
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Source: Appendix A.
coordination of local forms of political order (Epstein (2000)). Using this lens, we can iden-
tify periods in which the growing size of Portuguese budgets did not reflect higher levels
of ”stateness”. Fiscal income could rise just because the empire o↵ered additional domain
sources, as it happened with dyewood, gold or diamond extraction in Brazil farmed out to
powerful consortia. When leasing property rights over colonial resources, the kings under-
wrote a contract, incurring the risk of the other party’s moral hazard or default. Di↵erently,
taxes collected in the kingdom had implementation mechanisms involving both parties’ shar-
ing moral hazard risks. Taxpayers could breach the fiscal pact, because of either they free
ride as a strategy or suspect the ruler’s default if expenditure did not meet the alleged cause
for collecting more money. Therefore, to find how much the fiscal innovation during the
war of restoration heightened state’s capacity, we must focus on domestic taxation only and
reassess the values in column 2 (Table 1). Figure 1 displays government revenues net of
colonial rents. It shows that the restoration boosted revenues, collected through a new in-
come tax (the décima tax legally set at 10%), and lost momentum afterwards, so that 1680
capitation was below any other observation in the 17th century. This decline stemmed both
from the lower rate of the décima tax, now set at 4.5% in times of peace, and economic
contraction.
International comparisons using daily wages broaden the view on the décima impact
and social implications (Table 2). The national cases gathered in table 2 are representative
for di↵erent reasons. Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands were belligerents in the same




are illustrative of divergent paths due to contrasting political institutions, the former for
its early-centralized tax system assisted by representative institutions, and the latter for its
absolutist regime’s low fiscal capacity (Dincecco (2009) Ho↵man and Norberg (1994)).
Confirming the uniqueness of the Dutch path, data show this country’s heavy taxation
already in the first decades of the 17th century, the reason why scholars have referred to a
tax revolution waging the war against the Habsburgs (Fritschy (2003)). However, according
to data in Table 2, the fight against Philipe IV to regain political autonomy (1641-1668)
also became a landmark in Portugal’s fiscal history. After a period marked by a significant
gap relatively to Castile (1600-1649), the restoration pushed the tax load up to a level quite
above the English one. It appears that Portugal’s absolutist political constitution allowed
a fiscal capacity higher, or quite close, to that of England, still in the first half of the 18th
century.
3.2 Tax structure from the medieval age
Portugal’s fiscal performance from 1640 onwards owed much to an income tax that heightened
at an unprecedented level the importance of direct taxation for the royal treasury. The tax
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Table 2: Per capita government revenue in daily wages for unskilled workers
Portugal Spain Dutch Rep. England France
1500-1549 2.6 3.0 1.5 2.6
1550-1599 3.8 4.0 2.7 3.2
1600-1649 4.5 7.2 12.0 2.6 3.0
1650-1699 7.2 7.7 13.6 4.2 8.0
1700-1749 7.1 4.6 24.1 8.9 6.7
1750-1799 8.0 10.0 22.8 12.6 11.4
1800-1849 9.1 8.6 13.5 14.3
Sources: Portugal 1500-1819 in Appendix A, and Portugal 1800-1849 and other cases in
Palma and Reis (2016), based on Karaman and Pamuk (2010)
base of the décima tax (wages, rents, interests, and profits) became legitimate in Cortes,
from 1641 onwards, which enforced a 10% rate. In peace time it went down to 4.5%. Hence,
Portuguese taxpayers’ liability for an income tax had a long-lasting tradition when the liberal
regime, in the nineteenth century, reformed the operational costs of this source of revenue.
Before this enduring innovation, the kingdoms’ fiscal system had rested on indirect tax-
ation. Indeed, the prior statements on resources from the colonial empire demanding an
institutionally particular framework, go without saying that the colonial extension of the
Portuguese economy was marginal to the kingdom’s tax revenue. Portugal’s foreign trade
comprised the imports and re-exports of exotic commodities, which drove up customs duties
right from the turn of the 15th century to the 16th century ((Godinho, 1978, pp. 31-74),
Pereira (2003)). In the last decade of the 16th-century, customs and other fiscal revenues
exacted from maritime sectors hovered around 33-35% of the total levied in the domes-
tic market. There were no constitutional constraints to the crown’s alteration on tari↵s,
although they were not uniform taxes.
The role of indirect taxation was a feature of the Iberian kingdoms, altogether distinct
in this respect from other European political units at the outset of the colonial expansion.
Elsewhere in Europe, direct taxation (mainly based on land) performed the bulk of revenue
extraction. In Portugal, market-oriented production granted the base of a sales tax called
sisa, the equivalent to the alcabala enforced in Castile ((Tortella and Comn, 1993, p. 146),
(Dominguez Ortiz, 1983, p. 195)). It was administrated by six Almoxarifados (fiscal and
administrative regions), contributing approximately 90% of revenue collected in these fiscal
agencies. Revenues from Almoxarifados tended to equal customs, both sources performing
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two-thirds of the domestic fiscal revenue.
The sisa moulded the Portuguese fiscal system. Firstly, it allowed the Crown to leave the
land to the aristocracy and the church to tax. As a legacy of the extended period of the war of
Reconquista to the Muslims, those two political bodies, and leading contenders to the kings’
power, had their means of extracting an economic surplus from direct taxation. Secondly,
the sisa was in its origins a local tax, consigned to local expenditure under the management
of municipal assemblies. It turned out to be a uniform, centralized tax, to finance the war
against Castile in 1383. The alteration was approved in Courts and determined a first and
vital step towards fiscal centralization. Thirdly, the transfer of rights over the sisa from
local assemblies to the crown was legitimized as a donation, which was more than symbolic
procedure. It meant that this tax yields never contributed to the rewards the kings granted
the nobility. Finally, this medieval innovation demonstrated the capacity of the crown to
make uniform taxes to endure beyond the particular context that had legitimized it. The
complaints of the Third Estate (commoners) in later Courts insisting on the sisa regaining
its county characteristics had never deserved a positive response from sovereigns (Oliveira,
1972, pp. 298-320).
In 1565 the crown devolved collection to the municipalities but kept the yields centralized.
The reform implied the delivery of lump sums to the royal treasury, the amounts being rene-
gotiated every three to six years. The contract allowed some degree of freedom to handle tax
bases, so no wonder the amounts lost their initial tie to sales. The so-called ”encabeçamento”
(fixed amount) of the sisa may have halted the path towards fiscal centralization, as some
historians have claimed (Ferreira da Silva, 2004, p. 244). However, negotiation with local
powers did not necessarily penalize the political core, since fiscal decentralization assigned
the risk to local powers. There is evidence of municipal authorities creating new tax bases to
raise enough money to accomplish the sums contracted. Thus, 30 to 60% of the value of the
lump-sum (”cabeção”) needed occasional levies on wealth (Oliveira, 1972, p. 308, tables pp.
348 and 359). The new administration of the sisa made it similar to any system of quotas
common in Europe. The scheme of quotas, in Portugal as elsewhere, could solve operational
costs, as it happened in England with the Monthly Assessment taxes. It also respected
better the principle of a fiscal federation, as it happened in the Dutch Republic, wherein
the assignment of quotas to each Province went together with the centralized decision over
expenditures ((Beckett, 1985, pp. 285-308), (t Hart, 1993, p. 79)).
Hence, centralized decision over tax rates and expenditure together with tax collection
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assigned to local powers rooted the process of state-making in Europe. It occurred in the
absolutist Castile, as well as in parliamentary regimes, or federalist republics like England
or the Dutch Republic (Dincecco (2009); Dincecco and Katz (2016), Yun Casalilla (2004)).
Thus, it is worth mentioning that improvements in state’s fiscal capacity everywhere rested on
institutional arrangements that involved local powers and non-professional administrations,
still in 18th-century, as it happened in England with the Land Tax.
Importantly, in the case of Portugal the fiscal contract ruling the sisa, which involved mu-
nicipalties, contributed to smooth out the coercive character inherent to centralized decision
over expenditure. However, it also prevented the use of this source for raising extraordi-
nary money, which severely constrained the central power in periods of war. In the next
section we find the fundaments of Philip IV setbacks due to this fiscal constitution and the
underpinnings of Portugal’s political independence.
4 Philip IV and John IV tax burdens
In the 1630s, multiple fronts of war in Asia asked for increasing funds, whilst the war in
Flanders diverted Castilian resources. Philip IV’s purpose of raising the quota of the sisa
(encabeçamento) in 25% went together with the demand for other taxes, one based on income
and the other on excises on wine and meat. The budget dated from 1632 is the best archive
evidence available to assess how much these requests aggravated the current tax burden. The
domestic revenue totaled 822.5 million réis, of which 175.5 million came from Almoxarifados
and depended on more than 90% on the yields of the sisa. If this source were set to rise by
25%, it would add 43.9 million réis. To this amount, impositions on wine and meat in the
municipalities of the whole kingdom would contribute more 160 million réis. In short, Philip
IV was counting on raising further 200 million réis.
To gauge the impact of the additional 200 million over 822.5 million réis, estimated as
total tax receipts in the budget, we use prices of wheat, which also allows measuring the
impact of the financial request on the tax load. We take the average, between the lower and
upper bounds, of the price of one bushel in Lisbon, the largest urban center (220 réis), and
in Évora, the town in the southern area of Alentejo, where wheat took the most significant
share of the agrarian output (196 réis) 2. We thus estimate a tax receipt between 62,949,949
2Price per bushel in 1636: 196 réis (5 years moving average. Each bushel = 15 kg. See data on prices in
Santos (2003), Appendices, and http://pwr-portugal.ics.ul.pt/(Price,wages,andrentsinPortugal,
PWRproject).
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Table 3: Phillip IV and John IV fiscal demands




1 kg of wheat at Lisbon prices;
2 capitation/total consumption
total consumption = 547 kg
kg and 56,082,682 kg. The population at the time was close to 2,000,000 inhabitants ((Palma
and Reis, 2016, table A7)), pointing to a capitation 33-30 kg (table 3). Scholars have found
a similar capitation in Ancient Rome (Bonney, 1999, p. 9) so that our estimation points to
a capitation common to other agrarian economies.
The ratio capitation/consumption of wheat gives a measure of the tax load (see Table
3). Assuming the annual consumption per person could vary from 547 kg to 730 kg of wheat
(Oliveira (1980)), 33 kg per capita represented a tax burden hovering around 4.5- 6%. The
additional 200 million réis that Philip IV requested would set the capitation at 40 to 45 kg,
meaning a 1% increase in the tax burden. Hence, 4.5% tax load appears to have been a
threshold, above which political costs would have risen.
The Spanish rule looked for extra money without summoning the Cortes in Portugal
which disregarded the kingdom’s fiscal constitution. Furthermore, Portuguese taxpayers did
not handle well the Hapsburg’s claim for more money to wage wars in places the majority of
the people had not heard about. Colonial endeavors were in far distant territories overseas,
usually associated to the origin of riches, not to the need of higher taxes. The military
campaigns in North Africa had been an exception when they forced the kings John III and
Sebastião to ask for money in the 16th century. Such requests faced no resistance from
Catholic subjects convinced that the Crusade was worthy a subsidy.
Philip IV determination to increase the ”encabeçamento” of sisa in 25% to provide
military protection to possessions in Asia in the 1630s caused the first wave of discontentment.
But it was the king’s orders to introduce an income tax in 1638 which faced the most severe
resistance triggering the coup d’État in 1640. Portugal’s revolt against the Habsburg was
not an extraordinary event in the European history of state-making. Royal levies caused
popular uprisings and often not because of the peoples’ economic constraints, but rather
11
due to fiscal constitutional principles. However, uprisings in Portugal reached long-lasting
consequences, for they threw the seeds of political fragmentation in the Iberian Peninsula.
We ask why did Philip IV face such a sti↵ resistance from taxpayers. Tax load could be
already too heavy by late 1630s, as it was almost two times that in England, but on the
other hand, it was under the Castilian threshold.
If riots paved the way for the coup d’État in 1640, they may indicate the taxpayer’s
unwillingness to pay for removing a threat over too far-distant territories, where the majority
of the common people had no capital or interest. Besides, there were no constitutional
means of monitoring the expenditure of the money raised in Portugal. Thus constitutional
constraints could have also framed the events of 1640, but there is no doubt that taxpayers
showed sympathy for John IV . The same taxpayer who repudiated Philip IV’s needs endorsed
the rights of John Duke of Braganza to the throne of Portugal on December the 1st, 1640. The
new king eventually asked for one third more than the amount the Spanish king demanded
and met no resistance at all.
How the revolt unfolded is not a matter here, nor the full analysis of the political speech
building up the legitimacy of the coup d’État (Costa and Cunha (2006)). It is worth mention-
ing, however, that the church played an active part in the revolt. The sermons, particularly
after 1630, had supported the public view of a Spanish usurpation of power and extortion.
The process of political autonomy began on December, 1st of 1640 when noblemen invaded
the palace where the Vice Roy (the Duchess of Mantua) resided. At the county level, local
oligarchies (municipal assemblies) adhered to the secession immediately afterwards, justify-
ing the country’s military mobilization.
Between 1641 and 1642 an ambitious fiscal reform introduced a universal income tax
to wage a war mainly fought along the borders and in the plains of Alentejo, in southern
Portugal. The tax called décima had a 10% rate levied on rents (of urban or rural property),
profits, interests, and wages. It was expected to yield 680 million réis. Still, the reminder
189 million the new king asked for counted on indirect taxation. Eventually, the people
accepted levies on wine and meat, making the riots against Philip IV a demonstration that
taxpayers’ willingness to pay was a determinant variable of the fiscal capacity of absolutist
regimes. According to 1641 budget, the domestic economy sustained a revenue equivalent
to 90,308,123 kg of wheat (at Lisbon prices), that is, approximately 55 kg per capita, about
25% more than what had been refused to Philip IV. Such an increase of the tax load did not
leave archive evidence of riots or of any other form of political unrest after 1640. Hence, our
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findings trace back an innovation and a increase in the tax burden with small political costs.
Portugal won the war, which is the expected outcome considering the chance of victory
depended not only on the military technology but also on the small political costs inherent
to the confrontation (Ho↵man (2015)). However, tax evasion, as a silent form of resistance,
could have been the new king’s great challenge, given the revolutionary backdrop against
which the décima was being implemented. In the next section, we analyze the administrative
architecture of this fiscal reform and the taxpayers’ motivation in consenting to a more
burdensome taxation.
5 The décima tax: 1640-1800
The décima tax was sanctioned in Cortes to pay for the costs of the political autonomy as
if this was a common interest and not just the goal of a duke enthroned king. It demanded
a specific administration to assess and collect its yield. Local powers were involved in the
system right from the beginning. Considering that state making meant increasing fiscal
e ciency together with a territorialized system of coordination of local forms of political
order (Epstein (2000), this fiscal innovation encompassed the features that altered the level
of stateness of the Portuguese political unit as much as the sisa tax did in medieval times.
Municipalities were ruled by elected senates, whose members were of the middling sort,
usually in the network of aristocrats with local influence either for the extension of their
estates, or for seigniorial and jurisdictional rights in the region granted by the king. Every
three years, the name list of the elected members of senates required the kings to approve
it formally. These elected municipal senates administered local taxes and expenditure, as
well as the collection of central taxes as it happened with the sisa tax. As for the décima
tax, the aldermen appointed the assessors of taxable income under the supervision of local
agents of a central bureau known as Junta dos Três Estados (Council of the Three Estates).
This bureau worked as a royal council and gathered members from the three political bodies
assembled in Cortes (the church, the nobility, and the commoners - the Third Estate). The
money collected locally was redistributed among the military districts by this central bureau.
Resorting to aldermen and assigning the assessment and collection to decentralized struc-
tures not only lowered operational costs but also solved compliance issues by close monitoring
3. However, assessing the tax base had also high informational costs which initially called for
3Magalhães (2004) and legislation published in (Silva, 1856, p. 143-148) also on http://www.
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Table 4: Enforcement of the décima
assessment enforcement enforcement e↵ective tax
M réis M réis % %
1641-1649 680.0 397.0 58.4 5.8
1644 428.0 408.0 95.3 9.5
1650 628.2 502.6 80.0 8.0
1651 632.7 454.7 71.9 7.2
1652 635.8 296.6 46.6 4.7
1653 642.2 523.3 81.5 8.2
Sources: (Hespanha, 1994, p. 182); Lisbon Archives, Biblioteca da Ajuda 51-VI-19, fol. 127
and next; (Costa, 2004a, p. 41)
the expertise of agents outside the state administration. According to the law from 1642, the
modes of collection should follow the procedures well known to church agents (not necessarily
clergies) who handled the tithe, presuming these men knew how to evaluate income from a
given asset (capital or land). Hence, the church delivered information which allowed checking
the ledgers of the décima assessment. Studies in state building have seldom considered such
a role of religious administrations for their organizational and informational expertise 4.
The amounts assessed and collected provide us evidence of the administrative accomplish-
ments (Table 4). The numbers from the whole decade of the 1640s point to critical hurdles
in the implementation of the system, widening the gap between the amount authorized in
Cortes and the sum actually received by the Junta dos Três Estados (680 million against
397 million réis). However, data referring the particular year of 1644, for which we know in
detail the e cay of the tax collection, tell us that even in a phase implementation of the new
tax, the assessed revenue could be quite close to the amounts enforced. This year coincided
with the only decisive battle fought in the first decade of war.
From the standpoint of the central power, taxpayers’ evasion was the main concern form
the onset of the process. The state’s perception of flaws in the assessment procedures led
to the enactment of legislation deciding when and how the agents of the central administra-
tion (Junta dos Três Estados) should referee the process assigned to local administrations,
accepting the possibility of influential taxpayers bullying local assessors. Still, figures in
governodosoutros.ics.ul.pt/?menu=arquivo ).
4The role of religion in the process of state building is usually considered only for legitimation issues.
See, Rubin (2017).
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Table 4 point to a reasonable level of e cacy of a centralized income tax, locally collected
and implemented in a context of social turmoil. Enforcement reached an average 70% rate,
which may be considered an impressive outcome. At the same token, there is no evidence of
the use of violent means to exact the amounts, contrary to what happened in seventeenth
century France (Bonney, 1999, p. 434-435).
Explaining this innovation success is the main issue. Indeed, the Cortes assembling every
three-years created an institutional environment suited to tone down taxpayers’ resistance.
There was time to complain about the army disturbing the daily life of households, and
contend that taxes and conscription meant a double charge on taxpayers (Costa (2004b,a)).
There were further reasons for contention. In 1645, the municipalities claimed the money
was not properly managed, and a lot was being diverted by military o cers’ bribery to
relieve some men from conscription. Usually the government dealt with the protests by
creating the expectation that the war would be over by the time of the next summon of
Cortes (Costa (2004a)). Such expectations on the short-lividness of the war smoothed out
resistance and improved the e cacy of the fiscal innovation. (Ames and Rapp (1977)). As
for more educated and wealthy taxpayers, juridical arguments claiming the king’s rights to
the throne, and underlining the risks of expropriation should Philip IV have regained the
throne, certainly contributed to their low resistance to a heavier tax burden too. Indeed,
Cortes’ summoning helped to strengthen the bonds between king and subjects. Both the
king and the people learned about the other party’s expectations, the Cortes working as a
Parliament in this regard. Although it lacked the constitutional basis to restrain the kings’
decision and to control expenditures, Cortes may have had an e↵ect on taxpayers’ consent.
However, extrinsic mechanisms, possibly more powerful, must have made people accept
a fiscal deal that asked for a 30% rise in the tax burden, closer to an equilibrium tax rate,
as data on tax avoidance presented in Table 4 suggests. We conjecture that the rate of
enforcement was the fair price to pay for a perceived service, which consisted in diverting
a threat on daily lives of households, which a war fought in the proximity entailed. In-
dependently from the intrinsic motives, outlined previously, the extrinsic motives to pay
taxes could be fundamentally related to the place in which the war financed by the new
tax was fought. During the Habsburgs’ rule, the war waged by new taxes triggering violent
resistance, took place in territories distant from the taxpayers’ location. Conversely, during
the restoration war the consent for a high tax burden encompassed disturbances in closed
proximity to households, which accompanied the frequent quartering of troupes in villages.
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Table 5: The décima tax: 1641-1800






This implied people’s loss of capital due to well-documented requests of horses and cattle,
the accommodation of soldiers for an uncertain time, robbery perpetrated by both sides of
the conflict, and women victims of rape (Freitas (2007)). The accommodation of troupes in
villages of Alentejo (Mourão, for instance), destroyed most of the housing during the military
campaigns from 1659 onwards. The war also had maritime extensions, which endangered in
great extant colonial shipping.
The intimate relationship between the décima and war financing continued throughout
the rest of the early modern period, until the Seven Years’ war, as we can see in table 5:
it was set at 4.5% in peaceful times and at 10% in war times. Because 4.5% rate is equal
to minimum tax load we have found for the period in which we have data (see Table 3) we
conjecture that it was, more generically, payed for intrinsic reasons. In the next section, we
analyze the factors which could justify the rate of execution of the décima tax by extrinsic
motives.
6 Restoration war: data on damages and war intensity
Portugal’s fiscal capacity, like that of any other political unit undergoing a process of state
making, must have counted on taxpayers’ self-interest in complying with fiscal authorities
in times of war. Tracking a well-grounded literature, we recognize the critical role played by
in-doors warfare in state building. Before presenting and applying a model linking disorder
in a context of defensive war to taxpayers’ incentives, we need to examine the extent of
damages and the intensity of war.
To estimate war damages, we take data from the Alentejo as representative of inland war
losses. In this southward region of the country, many towns and villages were on the route
of the Spanish armies in case of invasion. Here stationed 50% of the infantry and 73% of the
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cavalry. The military district of Alentejo demanded 71% of the war budget, which is in clear
contrast with 1.7% spent with sea fortresses in the Lisbon / Cascais, Peniche and Setúbal 5.
No doubt the Alentejo was the area most exposed to military pressure. It appears to be the
best area to evaluate the impact of the conflict in agriculture.
The rental market in 31 properties provides data to calculate an average rate of damage.
Two series are available from Santos (2003). One contains the contract specified rent, and
the other contains the rents paid. The di↵erence was the outcome of many loss-making
situations; environmental factors interfered alongside war damages, inciting the tenants to
renegotiate the lease with the landlord. Rui Santos’ estimation of a risk index in agriculture
point to 6.4% in the 1640’s, 5.5% in the 1650’s, and 9.3% in the 1660’s. Apart from the
di↵erence between nominal and actual rents, this risk index covers the turnover of tenants
as reflecting the instability of the land market. In this paper, however, only the reduction
in rent is significant information. We need to compare uncertainty in the agrarian economy
with that in maritime contexts, a↵ecting shipping. The shipmasters’ turnovers in freight
contracts did not necessarily signal higher risk in the sector. Hence, for our purposes, the
ratio of contracted rents and actual rents is the information we use to estimate damages in
each property and an annual average of losses in the agrarian sector (Table ?? appendix and
Figure 2)
Rates of losses below 10% are largely more frequent than above that level. In peace
years, between 1668 and 1680, the average fell to 1.39%, which indicates the standard risk
in agriculture under normal weather. Conversely, a few peaks draw the attention to the first
year of the 1650s and early 1660s. The fact that the 1660s depict a dangerous phase, whereas
tenants’ default became occasional once the peace resumed, grants credibility to the data we
use to estimate war damages. We estimate a 4.6 % average rate of loss in the whole period
of war (1641-1668). In such a scenario, the enforcement of a tax rate above this threshold
would require taxpayer’s high aversion to risk, for him to consent, or substantial means of
coercion.
However, damages were also a liability at sea. Depletion of capital in shipping and the
loss of revenues depending on freights bring about a di↵erent picture. Although the Spanish
navy did not perpetrate attacks to Portuguese fleets, and despite Portugal’s di↵erent political
alignment after 1640, the Dutch privateering threatened Portuguese colonial shipping, the
assaults remaining a critical issue in two years (1647 and 1648), when half of the fleet
5Lisbon Archives, Biblioteca da Ajuda, Manuscripts, 51-VI-19, fl. 359-364.
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allocated to sugar transportation (104 ships), was lost (see the appendix for sources). The
war at sea prolonged the status quo that had started in the early 1630s when the WIC
conquered Pernambuco. The conflict ended in 1654 when the Portuguese chartered company,
the Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil, forced the WIC to capitulate. Information on
ships afloat and total casualties allow us to estimate a rate of damages, considering the
value of the ship, outfitting costs, freights and value of cargo (Table III in the appendix).
This calculation contemplates the loss of capital, while that in the agrarian sector considered
income flows of tenants and landlords. So, in our estimation of losses in shipping, we included
a discount factor that observed interest rates charged on bottomry loans. Results of this
educated guess point to a rate of damages hovering around 16.8%, which was close to the
insurance paid in Amsterdam (14%) for securing Portuguese capital back and forth from
Lisbon and Bahia, or from Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro in the 1640s6. The coincidence of
values warrants the credibility of the estimation.
To sum up, considering losses at sea and on land together, the legal tax rate could have
been closer to the aggregate rate of damages. If we assume the state’s revenues reflected
somehow the part of the maritime sector in the economy, a budget from 1660 suggest that
the sea contributed around 22% to the GDP. Taking those weights to calculate a geometric
mean (0.78 to damages in land and 0.22 at sea), we find a 7.2% aggregate rate of damages.
Throughout 28 years, however, the war went through considerably di↵erent phases of
intensity (Figure 2), which could a↵ect the tax rate of enforcement. After the first years
marked by the persistent fear of the Spanish invasion (1641-1645), although with one single
battle fought in 1644, the 1650s were mostly a time for the Spanish releasing the military
pressure on Portuguese territory. From 1656 onwards, mainly after the Treaty of Pyrenees
(1659), the Castilian army concentrated in the Peninsula borders and the attacks gained
momentum. The decisive battles occurred in the 1660s. The data on war intensity are based
on the number of events reported by contemporary military chronicles (see Conde da Ericeira
(1698)). We considered the number of battles and smaller assaults, the total men conscripted
in infantry and cavalry, giving to cavalry a weight five times higher than infantry. We build
a synthetic index of war intensity, explained in the appendix, as a geometrical average of
the weighted war episodes and conscription. Table B8 and Figure 2 gathers the data on the
war intensity as we estimated it. Once we know the evolution of damages and war intensity,
we can go further in explaining the rate of the décima enforcement as displayed in table 4.
6(Spooner, 1983, p. 57)
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Figure 2
Source: Santos (2003) and our calculation (see the Appendix B).
This is the central topic of the next section.
7 The taxpayer compliance behavior
The literature on tax compliance (surveyed, for instance, in Andreoni et al. (1998), Slem-
rod and Yitzhaki (2002), Slemrod (2007), and Luttmer and Singhal (2014)), usually dealing
with the taxpayer behavior in a context of uncertainty, generically distinguishes the motives
for paying taxes into extrinsic and intrinsic motives. Intrinsic motives are non-pecuniary and
relate to the existence of a minimum tax that the taxpayer is voluntarily willing to pay on
morality, fairness, social identification, social pressure or similar grounds. Extrinsic motives
are associated to rational compliance when there are direct benefits, pecuniary or not, for
compliance with or avoidance to paying taxes. There are two main strands in the literature
featuring extrinsic motives. A first strand, initiated by Alligham and Sandmo (1972)(see
also Cowell (1985)), models tax compliance as a solution to a gamble with the tax authority
where the incentive to pay taxes stems from the potential penalties that would be incurred
if there is tax avoidance. A second strand in the literature, that we can trace back to Cowell
19
and Gordon (1988), incorporates another incentive for paying taxes arising for the awareness
that taxes finances public goods deemed beneficial by the taxpayer and that will not be
provided otherwise, even though there is the potential for free-riding.
In the rest of this section we try to identify the motives for tax compliance, before and
after the introduction of the décima tax, by appealing to that literature. To do this, we have
to accept that the tax authority fixes a legal tax rate, in a context of asymmetric information
in which the taxpayer knows the true income but the tax authority only knowns the income
reported by the taxpayer or assessed by the tax assessor. In this environment, there is tax
evasion/avoidance if there is income under-reporting, which implies that the e↵ective tax
rate, ⌧ , is smaller than the legal tax rate t (10% in most of the period).
Firstly, we introduce the extrinsic motive to pay taxes. In order to relate the model
to data we take the information on the e↵ective tax rate already presented in table 4, and
consider two extrinsic motives for paying taxes: playing the Alligham and Sandmo (1972)
gamble with the tax authority, and identifying the Cowell and Gordon (1988) benefit with
the reduction of war damages by financing the king John IV army. For the period starting
in 1638 until the end of the restoration war we can consider four possible states of nature
(non-existence of penalties and no war, existence of war but no penalties, existence of war





No (1  p)(1  q) (1  p) q 1  p
Yes p (1  q) p , q p
1  q q
The rows present the probabilities of the two states of nature associated to the existence
of war (1   p if there is no war and p if there is war) and in the columns the probabilities
of the two states of nature associated to the existence of penalties for tax avoidance (1   q
if there are no penalties and q if there are penalties war). While the outer cells display
unconditional probabilities, the inner cells present conditional probabilities: (1  p)(1  q) is
the joint probability of not having both war and penalties, (1  p) q is the joint probability
of not having war but of having penalties, p (1  q) is the joint probability of having war but
not penalties, and p q is the probability of having both war and penalties.
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The associated disposable income, that is entirely consumed, associated to every state of
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In the event in which there are no war damages and no penalties the disposible income
is equal to y(1  ⌧), that is, it is equal to pre-tax income, y, minus the e↵ective tax paid ⌧y,
which we assume is not higher than the tax payment if there were no tax avoidance ty. In
the events where penalties for tax avoidance exist, we take the Alligham and Sandmo (1972)
penalty. This is a linear function, with parameter  T > 0, of the taxpayer unreported income






the events in which there are war damages, we assume that the taxpayer faces a damage
proportional to his income, d, and which he believes can be reduced by its participation
in financing the war e↵ort by paying taxes proportional, with parameter  W > 0, to its








. If there are both war and tax penalties we add the two e↵ects.
In this case the disposable income is thus y
⇣







The extrinsic dimension of tax compliance is modelled by assuming that the value of pay-
ing taxes is captured by maximizing a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, E[u(C)],
where the Bernoulli function (u(C)) is concave for encoding risk aversion. Although con-
sumption is random, we saw that every possible outcome is a function of e↵ective tax rate,
⌧ , which allows us to use it as the decision variable for the taxpayer.
Secondly, we can also infer, from the people’s reaction to Phillip IV tax innovation, from
the history of the décima tax, that intrinsic motives for paying taxes were also present. We
estimate, from the minimum e↵ective tax which was observed ( 4.7% in table 4) and from
the tax rate in peaceful times (in table 5), that there was a tacit acceptance of a minimum
tax rate of 4.5%.
Therefore, taking into consideration both extrinsic and intrinsic motives, the taxpayer
problem consists in finding the optimal e↵ective tax that maximizes expected utility, such
7It can be proved that the Yitzhaki (1974) version, in which the penalty is proportional to the unpaid
tax, although looking more realistic produces less intuitive results.
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E[ u(C(⌧)) | ⌧min  ⌧  t ]
where we assume that ⌧min  t.
Solving the problem (see Appendix C) we find that the optimal tax, which is the e↵ec-
tive tax the taxpayer would willingly pay, depends on the risk aversion parameter, on the
parameters  T and  W , representing respectively the penalty for tax avoidance and the war
damage relief, on the war damages d, on both probabilities, p and q, and on the legal tax t.
If we consider the optimal tax as a function of the legal tax, taking other parameters
and variables as given, that is ⌧ ⇤ = ⌧(t, .), and represent it graphically as in figure 3, we
find that tax-payers find optimal to have one of three types of behavior: total compliance,
partial compliance or minimum compliance. Total compliers (see figure 3a) report truthfully
and, therefore, their optimal e↵ective tax rate is equal to the legal tax rate. Minimum
compliers (see figure 3c) will only be willing to pay the minimum (intrinsic) tax rate. Partial
compliers/evaders (see figure 3b) will be in an intermediate situation, by finding optimal
to pay a tax higher than the minimum but bellow the legal tax rate. Figure 3 provides a
geometrical illustration of the fiscal strain associated to the enacted legal tax, as the vertical
distance between the optimal tax from the perspective of the tax payer (in the point labelled
”equal compliance”) and the legal tax rate (in the point labelled ”full compliance”).
We can apply this model to the two historical experiments we mentioned earlier: first,
the Phillip IV attempt to increase taxation, and second, the financing of the Restoration
war shortly after 1640.
The first experiment, following Phillip IV’s decision, corresponds to a case in which
p =  W = d = 0. The only uncertainty for the tax-payer was related to the gamble with
tax authorities. We can conjecture that the attempted tax increase would increase the fiscal
strain either by transferring the taxpayer from a state of partial commitment (as in figure
3b ) to a state of minimum commitment (as in figure 3c ), or from two states of minimum
commitment in which the di↵erence of the optimal tax and the legal tax would increase. In
any case, although we have no data to corroborate this conjecture, the large increase in the
fiscal strain was certainly instrumental in triggering the revolt.
The second experiment, the financing of the Restoration war, provides us with some data
8It is easy to prove that it would not be rational to pay taxes higher than the legal tax, unless the
consumer derives utility from being a donor.
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Figure 3: Types of optimal behavior
(a) full compliance (b) Partial compliance (c) Minimun compliance
allowing for empirical verification of our theory: we have yearly data for ⌧ , for the period
between 1650 and 1653, and we constructed a time series for the rate of damage d (see table
B6 and figure 2). Two observation can be extracted from the data on the e↵ective tax payed
and the damages computed for the period between 1650 and 1653: first, the e↵ective tax
rate hoovering between 4.7% and 8.2%, corresponds to the partial compliance case; second,
there is a positive correlation between our e↵ective tax rate and the rate of damages (the
elasticity is 0.26). This positive correlation can only be consistent with a case in which,
although war depredations decreased income, the taxpayer expected to be in an even worst
situation if the Portuguese army were under-financed and military weaker. This is clearly
consistent with a Cowell and Gordon (1988) motive to pay taxes consisting in avoiding war
destruction.
We find this enables us to go a step further and calibrate the e↵ective tax rate for the
whole period between 1640 and 1667 taking the data on war damages and war intensity. To
carry this exercise, we start by setting q =  T = 0, which is justified by the fact that, in that
period, the tax collection rested mainly on a decentralized administration and therefore it
was very dependent on voluntary tax compliance. Second, we assume an isoelastic Bernoulli
utility function and set the Arrow-Pratt coe cient of relative risk aversion to 2. Third,
we match the model with the previous regression to find an approximation for both the
parameter  W and a level for the probability p for the period 1650-1653. At last, using the
previous parameters values and the series for d and p in figure 2 we simulated our model for
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Figure 4
Simulated e↵ective tax for:   = 2,  W = 0.5, t = 0.1, ⌧min = 0.045 and for the series for d
and p in table C11
the e↵ective tax rate for the period 1642-1667 (see the Appendix C for a detailed derivation
and calibration of the model).
The results of that simulation are depicted in figure 4. We not only find all three types
of taxpayer behavior within that period, but we also find that they are highly correlated
to the intensity of the war. There is full compliance in the years of high belligerence and
war damages (in early 1640s and in most of the 1660s), there is minimum compliance in
the intermediate periods with low belligerence and low damages (in most of the 1650s), and
there is partial compliance in intermediate cases (in late 1640s and early 1650s).
Therefore, state capacity and war are positively correlated only if taxpayers find utility
in financing the war e↵ort. In the absence of taxpayers’ compliance, war financing may
increase tax strain thereby increasing the political costs of wagging war. It is possible that
compliance with taxes financing wars are positively correlated to the distance between the
war theatre and the location of the taxpayer.
8 Final remarks
This paper questioned the factors for the success of financial innovations, which made up
early modern states’ increasing fiscal capacity. The case under analysis rested on an universal
income tax, and on the centralization of both the revenue and expenditure, while the collec-
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tion of the new tax was left to local, ad-hoc administrations, encroached in taxpayers’ nets.
In this regard, the Portuguese fiscal history points to a deviant path, in which the relative
ine ciency of absolutist regimes and of decentralized tax administrations is not observed.
The case under scrutiny bore the advantage of making it clear the taxpayers’ behavior is a
crucial element in the processes of state making. The same taxpayer who refused the Habs-
burg’s king high tax load, payed willingly a higher tax, around one third superior, to finance
a war that ensued the coup d’état in 1640 to regain political autonomy. In the short period
of time between the 1638 fiscal riots, and revolt, and the enthronement of the Portuguese
king in 1640 we deem the introduction of structural improvements in the state’s capacity,
permitting the enforcement of the new taxation, as highly improbable. Historical events thus
fundament the hypothesis, put forward in this study, that taxpayer’s consent for taxation
under absolutist regimes could be a critical variable in the enhancement of the state’s fiscal
capacity. For the success of the income tax introduced into the Portuguese fiscal system,
and which withstood the liberal revolution in 1820, the assignment to local administrations
of the tax collection may have been a crucial device. It enhanced the role of peer monitoring
that, in this regard, may not be a sign of resilient, traditional institutional arrangements. It
may instead be the most e↵ective way of instilling social norms that contributed to build up
the taxpayer’s liability, which somehow the liberal state in 19th century exploited within a
di↵erent technological environment.
This study suggests that intrinsic motives driving taxpayers’ tax morale allowed for a
4.5% rate as a minimum optimal tax rate, ensuring fiscal income without critical political
costs. The fact that this level for the income tax remained in the Portuguese fiscal system
as the legal tax rate in times of peace points to a government’s acknowledgement of the
potential existence of a fiscal strain and of the advantages of substituting the coercive com-
ponent ascribed to a centralized administration by reputational constraints exerted at the
community level.
The notion that high levels of destruction improved fiscal capacity through taxpayer’s
self-interest in diverting a threat on capital and income is another inference from the anal-
ysis conducted in this article. That being the case, more capitalized economies, as those
more dependent on the maritime sectors, could have been assisted by higher levels of tax-
payers’ consent in the rise of taxation. Through di↵erent lens, this study meets other stud-
ies’ conclusions, which have highlighted the importance of market-oriented activities in the
enhancement of states’ fiscal capacity, based on modern tax centralization and political rep-
25
resentation.
Finally, this case study proved that a significant gap between fiscal income and e↵ective
fiscal capacity can occur, due to observed gaps between legal tax rates and optimal tax rate
from the point of view of the taxpayer. In many instances, historical data do not allow us to
measure evasion, and, when measuring fiscal capacity, the important di↵erence between legal
and e↵ective tax rates are overlooked. In Portuguese history, as it has been documented,
that gap was not necessarily due to taxpayers economic constrains leading to evasion, rather
it presents a case where political variables conditioned taxpayers’ perception of the use of
taxation. In this respect, war at home was the main factor for inducing taxpayers in paying
taxes. In some points in European history, the desintegration of the Habsburg unit can be
observed through this dynamic between war inside borders and war in distant territories as
the main source of taxpayers’ a↵ection or disa↵ection.
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Conde da Ericeira (1679-1698). História de Portugal Restaurado. Civilização, Porto, An-
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Appendix A Sources on Portuguese state capacity
Published budgets
• Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa (1973). Colecção São Lourenço, volume VI.
Lisboa, p. 37-9
• Brito, P. (2013a). Estimativa das receitas e despesas anuais do Reino e da ı́ndia.
Fragmenta Historica: História, Paleografia e Diplomática, 1, p. 153-9
• Brito, P. (2013b). Folha da receita e despesa do Reino para 1563. Fragmenta Historica:
História, Paleografia e Diplomática, 1, p. 169-172
• Carrara, A. (2011). Receitas Imperiais Portuguesas, estrutura e conjunturas, séculos
xvi/xviii. Technical Report Working Paper, Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora
• Description de ville de Lisbonne Pierre Humbert, 1730, p. 166-168. Revenue de la
Couronne de Portugal.
• Costa, F. D. (2008). Army size, military recruitment and financing in portugal during
the period of Peninsula War - 1808-1811. e-Journal of Portuguese History, 6(2)
• Dias, J. A. (1985). Um documento financeiro do século xvii. Nova História, VII(3/4)
and Lisbon Archives, Ajuda Library, Manuscripts,, 51-VI-19, fl. 127
• Falcão, L. F. (1859). Livro em que se contem toda a fazenda e real património dos
reinos de Portugal, Índia e Ilhas Adjacentes
• Gavetas da Torre do Tombo, vol I, p.893
• Godinho, V. M. (1978). Ensaios. Sobre história de Portugal, volume II, chapter Fi-
nanças públicas e estrutura do estado, pages 29–74. Almedina, Lisboa, 2nd edition, p.
29-74
• Hespanha, A. M. (1994). As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder poĺıtico.
Portugal, século XVII. Almedina, Lisboa, p. 114 and p.158
• Mendes da Luz, F., editor (1949). Relação de toas as rendas da coroa deste reino
de Portugal que nele se arrecadão de que procedem, modo e lugares em que se pagão.
Biblioteca da Universidade, Coimbra
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• Nicolau de Oliveira, Tratado da Grandeza de Lisboa, data provided by (Godinho, 1978,
p.31-74)
• Prestage, E. (1920). Três consultas do Conselho da Fazenda de 1656 a 1657. Revista
de História, (34), p. 9
Unpublished data
Lisbon Archives:
• Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Conselho Ultramarino, cod. 37, fl. 74
• Biblioteca da Ajuda (Ajuda Library), Manuscripts, 51-VI-19, fl 359-364
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Appendix B War damages and war data
Damages on land and sea
• Damages on land: see table B6. Source:
Santos, R. (2003). Sociogénese do latifundismo moderno. Mercados, crises e mudança
social na região de Évora. Séculos XVII a XIX. Banco de Portugal, Lisboa
• Damages in sea: see table B7. Computations and sources:
– Capital at sea: estimation based on costs of setting up a ship (accounting for 210-
day voyage back and forth and interest rates), on the rate of optimal exploitation
of each ship payload tonnage, freight rates per ton, and total number of ships
annually transporting sugar
Costa, L. F. (2002). O Transporte no Atlântico e a Companhia Geral do Comércio
do Brasil (1580-1663), volume I-II. CNCDP, Lisboa pp. 175-178, p.319, p. 360
and Appendix V).
– Data on cargo value (prices of sugar only): (Costa, 2002, p. 241),
Mauro, F. (1983). Le Portugal, le Brésil et lAtlantique au XVII ème Siècle.
Fondation Calouste Gulbenkien, Paris, pp. 298-299,
Schwartz, S. (1988). Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society
Bahia, 1550-1835. Companhia das Letras, São Paulo, Brazilian edition, pp. 400-
401.
– Sources on casualties:
Laet, J. (1925). História ou Anais dos Feitos da Companhia Privilegiada das
Índias Ocidentais, desde o seu começo até ao fim do ano de 1636, volume II.
Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 621-636.
Boxer, C. (1957). The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
Appendix III.
War data
War data, see table B8, source: Conde da Ericeira (1679-1698). História de Portugal
Restaurado. Civilização, Porto, Anotações e Prefácio de António álvaro Dória, 1945-1946, 4
v. edition
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Table B6: Damages in land
Date
Rents Damages
contracted levied total proportional
1641 5807.8 5299.4 508.4 0.088
1642 2762.3 2568.8 193.6 0.070
1643 5499.9 5103.0 396.9 0.072
1644 2653.2 2653.2 0.0 0.000
1645 5374.3 5109.3 265.1 0.049
1646 5536.9 5315.9 221.0 0.040
1647 5637.3 5205.3 432.1 0.077
1648 5499.5 5499.5 0.0 0.000
1649 5391.9 5391.9 0.0 0.000
1650 5209.3 3900.1 1309.2 0.251
1651 2871.5 2680.0 191.6 0.067
1652 2777.5 2680.1 97.4 0.035
1653 4952.2 4342.3 609.9 0.123
1654 5778.2 5778.2 0.0 0.000
1655 5523.5 5280.5 243.0 0.044
1656 5892.5 5606.5 286.0 0.049
1657 5102.9 4756.8 346.1 0.068
1658 5349.9 5062.6 287.2 0.054
1659 5625.8 4918.7 707.1 0.126
1660 5845.6 5496.4 349.2 0.060
1661 5296.8 4779.7 517.1 0.098
1662 2150.7 1524.3 626.4 0.291
1663 3748.2 2853.4 894.9 0.239
1664 4831.5 3655.9 1175.5 0.243
1665 4210.3 3108.1 1102.2 0.262
1666 4033.9 3556.6 477.3 0.118
1667 5624.2 5322.1 302.1 0.054
1668 5500.9 5070.8 430.1 0.078
1669 5408.4 5154.6 253.9 0.047
1670 5687.9 5435.2 252.8 0.044
1671 4908.6 4683.9 224.7 0.046
1672 4942.3 4716.2 226.1 0.046
1673 5403.1 5103.1 300.0 0.056
1674 4298.5 3977.1 321.4 0.075
1675 5029.2 4785.7 243.5 0.048
1676 5529.3 5282.9 246.4 0.045
1677 5087.1 4385.7 701.4 0.138
1678 4685.9 4180.6 505.2 0.108
1679 5623.4 5373.1 250.3 0.045
Source: Santos (2003).
7





interest rate level rate
1624 0.5 1072538400 210346785.9 0.196
1625 0.5 1263929048 36247577.5 0.029
1626 0.5 1163185632 21724028.9 0.019
1627 0.5 1496119740 373415881.4 0.250
1628 0.7 1726200240 162582428.8 0.094
1629 0.85 2322847415 63626633.3 0.027
1630 1 2051873133 190986550.2 0.093
1631 1.025 1489311510 194555687.7 0.131
1632 1.05 1654242900 167111678.8 0.101
1633 1.075 1833100215 596319203.5 0.325
1634 1.1 1319659248 333249038.9 0.253
1635 1.2 1261805160 105165952.9 0.083











1647 0.75 1518315000 450555000 0.297
1648 0.8 1815540000 938655000 0.517
average 1543204610 694605000 0.169
Sources: see main text
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Table B8: War episodes and enlistings
year episodes enlistings
infantry cavalry
1642 23 21700 4380
1643 30 26700 3490
1644 19 14800 3600
1645 12 8900 3000
1646 12 30700 3400
1647 10 3900 1110
1648 4 5000 1900
1649 10 2820 1890
1650 12 1300 3260
1651 9 3350 2350
1652 6 2750 2700
1653 4 1375 2100
1654 3 0 1500
1655 1 2200 0
1656 4 0 250
1657 16 20000 3344
1658 16 42500 11220
1659 5 11000 2500
1660 3 8300 3200
1661 10 9800 5900
1662 24 25400 4200
1663 19 37000 6550
1664 22 48000 14700
1665 14 34700 8900
1666 8 9600 7800
1667 12 6500 4600
Source: Conde da Ericeira (1698)
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Appendix C The taxpayer problem in the war-damage
case
There are two states of nature, no war or war, with probabilities 1  p and p. In the event
of no war consumption is equal to income net of taxes, and in the event of war consumption
is equal to net income minus the destruction caused by war.
The legal tax rate is denoted by t and the before-tax income of the taxpayer is y. However,
the e↵ective tax rate, from the perspective of the tax-payer is ⌧ . Using the Alligham and
Sandmo (1972) approach it is defined such as ⌧y = tyr, where yr is the reported income.
Therefore tax avoidance (or evasion) is e = y   yr. Denoting " = e/y the e↵ective tax is
⌧ = t(1  ").
There are several reasons for paying taxes. In our case we consider just two: fairness
and contribution to a public good in the form of war avoidance. We model the first motive
by assuming that ⌧   ⌧min, where ⌧min is the fair tax and the second motive is implicitly
incorporated by assuming that the war damage takes the form D = (d +   ")y, where d are
war damage in the absence of tax evasion if there was no tax evasion and  " is the additional
war damage associated to the fact that tax evasion will reduce resources to fight the war,
meaning the the invaders would be stronger and, though both armies generate war damages,
the damages cause by invaders are worst. We assume that damages are a random variable


















We assume the taxpayer evaluates its random consumption through a von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.
E[u(C)] = (1  p) u (c
no war
) + p u (c
war
)
displaying risk-aversion, i.e., .u(.) is a concave function. We assume a constant risk-averse
utility function, which allows us to parameterize risk aversion, by a parameter  , because of
its homogeneity properties allows us to compare the model with data.
Therefore
E[u(C)] = (1  p)(cno war)
1  






for     1. Because the consumption realizations in each of the two states of nature, in
equation (1), is a function of the e↵ective tax rate, we assume that the tax-payer chooses





 ⌧  t].
The constraint is justified by the fact that the consumer, by intrinsic reasons, is willing to
pay a minimum tax, ⌧min and that it will not be rational to pay more than the legal tax rate
t.
We introduce the magnitude







which is only defined for 0 <    t < 1.










(1      ✓   d)
(1  ✓)t    if t1 < t < t2 <  
⌧min if t2  t   , or t >  
(3)




(t) ⌘ (1  ✓(t, .))(1  t) and d
2









(t) if t = ⌧min or t =   and d1(t) > d2(t) if ⌧min < t <   then t1 < t2 for
t <  .
The optimal income tax rate, from the perspective of the tax-payer, ⌧ ⇤ = ⌧(t, d, , p,  , ⌧
min
)
is a ramdom variable which is a function of the legal tax rate, the probability of war, the
coe cient of relative risk aversion, the destruction parameter and the intrinsic motive repre-
sented by the minimum tax. The response to increases in the legal tax rate is is ambiguous,
but it is an unambiguously increasing function of the probability of war and the degree of
risk aversion and it is a decreasing function of the degree of damages.
Furthermore, the tax-payer can have three di↵erent types of optimal behavior, depending
on the lagal tax rate: if the tax rate is low (lower than t
1
) he behaves as a full complier, if
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) it will be a partial complier; and
if it is too high (higher than t
2
) or the reduction in damages by paying taxes is too low he
pays only the ”fair” tax rate ⌧min.
In our application we assume that   and   are set parametrically, the damages d is
a random variable, and the probabilitiy p can change, depending on the intensity of war.
However, while the relationship with p is ambiguous, there is a positive relationship of the





    (1  ✓)t > 0
9
Therefore, one important test to our One important feature of the model is that, when
the tax-payer finds optimal to be a partial complier, i.e, for ⌧min < ⌧ < t the tax rate is a
positive function of the damages, d
Proof of equation (3)
First we write the Lagrangean
L = E [u(C(⌧))] + µ (⌧   ⌧min) + µ+(t  ⌧)











= 0, ⌧min < ⌧ < t, µ  = µ+ = 0









< 0, ⌧min = ⌧ < t, , 0 = µ+ < µ 









> 0, ⌧min < ⌧ = t, , 0 = µ  < µ+













(1  p)(1  ⌧)   + p
⇣
















  0 is that   > t and (2)





















✓ + d+     1
    (1  ✓)t
◆
for ✓ as in equation (2), which is only defined for     t. Within this domain, we can obtain
critical values for t, which are associated to the corner solutions. However, we can only
obtain implicit values: first, for the case in which ⌧ ⇤ = t we obtain
t
1
= {t : (1  t)(1  ✓(t)) = d} ;







✓ + d+     1







@t > 0 then t1 < t2.
Calibrating the model
To study the likelihood and the implications of the model we consider the only relevant
data we have for the average e↵ective tax rate, ⌧ , together with the data obtained for the
rate of damages d. Unfortunately the only data we have, with common information for the
two variables, is for a very short period and is assembled in table C9: an average for the
1641-1649 and yearly data between 1650 and 1653. We observe that there is always partial
compliance, possibly with the exception of the year 1652 in which the tax rate is close to
what we consider to be the minimum tax ⌧min ⇡ 4.5%. Furthermore, there is clearly a
positive correlation between the average tax payed and the average damages d. This lends
for a generic confirmation to the model.
We use this information to calibrate the parameter   and to build a series for the proba-
bility p. We follow several steps:
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Table C9: Data and model calibration (in percentages)
1641-1649 1650 1651 1652 1653
observed
⌧ 5.8 8 7.2 4.7 8.2
d 12.6 19.6 5.2 2.7 9.6
1. First, we take data for the years 1650 and 1653 and ran regressions between ⌧ and d.




log d. We obtained
the results reported in table C10
Table C10: Regression results
    t  Pr(> |t|)
 ̂
0
-1.9872 0.3140 -6.328 0.0241
 ̂
1
0.2643 0.1150 2.299 0.1483
R̄
2 = 0.5582, F = 5.285 p  value = 14.8%
Taking exponentials we have a non-linear statistical model for the e↵ective tax rate
⌧ = e 0d 1
2. Second, looking at the partial compliance case, we obtained a theoretical linear model







⌘ t(✓ +     1)
    (1  ✓)t , ↵1 ⌘
t
    (1  ✓)t
3. Third, we approximate locally the non-linear statistical model at the average values











= ⌧̄   ↵̂
1
d̄ ⇡ 0.0507.
4. Fourth, assuming that   = 2 and knowing that t = 0.1 we solve jointly ↵
0




( , p, .) = ↵̂
1
we obtain   ⇡ 0.5067 and p = 0.1177
5. Fifth, we use data in table B8 to build a probability index, by taking into account data
on the war episodes, the yearly new enlistings of infantry and cavalry, as a weighted
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with a weight !. We divide the number of episodes by the 12, the number of months
in a year, and assume that damages caused by cavalry are 5 times those generated by
infantry and divided the value obtained by one-third of the portuguese population at
the time (1.8 millions). We compute the weight ! such that the average for the period
1650 to 1653 for p̂ matches closely the calibrated value for p (i.e. p = 0.1177). We get
p̂ ⇡ 0.12 if ! ⇡ 1
2
.
6. At last, we applied the parameters thus obtained, together with the data for the dam-
ages and the estimate of the war probability to equation (3) to obtain the last column
in table C11.
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Table C11: Data and calibration of the tax rate
year d p ⌧
1642 0.07 0.37 10.0
1643 0.07 0.43 10.0
1644 0.00 0.29 10.0
1645 0.05 0.20 10.0
1646 0.04 0.28 10.0
1647 0.08 0.11 4.8
1648 0.00 0.09 4.5
1649 0.00 0.13 5.9
1650 0.25 0.17 8.4
1651 0.07 0.14 6.4
1652 0.04 0.12 5.0
1653 0.12 0.08 4.5
1654 0.00 0.06 4.5
1655 0.04 0.02 4.5
1656 0.05 0.03 4.5
1657 0.07 0.29 10.0
1658 0.05 0.47 10.0
1659 0.13 0.13 5.7
1660 0.06 0.10 4.5
1661 0.10 0.23 10.0
1662 0.29 0.39 10.0
1663 0.24 0.43 10.0
1664 0.24 0.61 10.0
1665 0.26 0.39 10.0
1666 0.12 0.23 10.0
1667 0.05 0.22 10.0
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